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In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses on the tradeoffs facing a 
terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide and conventional 
terrorism tactics. The terrorist organization’s objective is to successfully attack at least one 
target. Success for the target government is defined as defending all targets from any and all 
attacks. In this context, we examine how terrorist entities strategically utilize suicide attacks 
when other modes of attack are available, and the optimal anti-terrorism measures. 
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Part of this work was completed while Kovenock was Visiting Professor at the Social Science 
Research Center Berlin (WZB). 1 Introduction
Terrorism is a form of asymmetric conﬂict in which terrorists utilize violent actions against
(mainly civilian) noncombatants in order to inﬂuence a target audience beyond the immediate
victims and, ultimately, to obtain ideological, political or religious objectives. Whereas
terrorism is asymmetric in that terrorist groups have a relative resource disadvantage with
respect to the target government, there also exist structural asymmetries between attack
and defense which terrorists can turn to their advantage through their selection of targets
and tactics. For example, governments with high-proﬁle counterterror policies (e.g., the war
on terror), or those facing a coordinated terrorist campaign (e.g., the French in Algeria) are
often judged by their ability to deter or interdict all attacks. As is written in the Joint
House-Senate Intelligence Inquiry into September 11, 2001 (US Congress, 2002), terrorists
need to be successful only once to kill Americans and demonstrate the inherent vulnerabilities
they face. This suggests that, as a whole, the set of targets of interest to terrorist groups
may be viewed as a weakest-link network from the perspective of a target government. Our
point is that in addition to the traditional treatment of terrorism-as-asymmetric-conﬂict in
terms of the relative resource disparity between terrorists and their ultimate targets, an
additional asymmetry exists through the deﬁnition of success. For the target government,
success is deﬁned in terms of security against all possible attacks; whereas for terrorists
one success is often enough to alter the political landscape, airways, etc. If one target is
successfully attacked, then counterterror policy and the competency of the government itself
can be subject to public scrutiny. Success for the terrorist can mean (total) failure for the
state, no matter how many prior terror attempts have been foiled. Moreover, at the target
level, the breach of an interdependent network for airline travel or an oil pipeline can disrupt
much (if not all) of the entire system. In this way, there are sound reasons for examining
counterterror policy and terrorist tactics from the perspective of defending weakest links.
The term weakest link stems from Hirshleifer’s (1983) metaphor about the public good
provided by dike builders on the perimeter of a circular island (c.f. Cornes 1993, Hausken
2002). Whoever builds the lowest dike will deﬁne the entire island’s level of defense against
a ﬂood. For target governments facing a terrorist campaign, the threat can be just as unre-
lenting as a rising sea, probing for a weak point that highlights their target’s susceptibility.
For example, after bombing the Brighton hotel where Margaret Thatcher was staying in the
1980s, and failing to kill her, the IRA issued a statement. It read: ‘Today you have been
lucky. But you have to be lucky every time. We only have to be lucky once,’ (King 2008).
Furthermore, when the vulnerability of one target not only depends on its choice of security
1measures, but also on the actions of others, a situation of interdependent security can arise
that is consistent with a weakest link. Heal and Kunreuther (2005) give the example of air-
line baggage screening. Speciﬁcally, the 1988 crash of Pan Am 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland
was due to a bomb that was contained in a bag initially screened by Malta Airlines in Malta,
thereby constituting the weak link.
In addition, just as a wave may crest at the right moment to break the dike, terrorists
have an additional tactic at their disposal. Suicide terrorism, which accounts for an average
of twelve times more damage than conventional attacks (Sandler et al 2008), has increased
in recent years (Economist 2008). The modern use of this tactic dates to the 1983 Beirut
bombings by Hezbollah against US and French military personnel, with the bombings being
viewed as bringing about these nations’ troop withdrawals from Lebanon. This tactic was
subsequently adopted by the Tamil Tigers (LTTE) and Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK),
and has been indelibly ingrained into the American psyche subsequent to the mass casualty
suicide attacks of September 11, 2001 (called 9/11 hereafter). Yet no group that employs
suicide terror does so exclusively (Crenshaw 2007). For example, the 3 March 2004 train
station bombings in Madrid are associated with aﬃliates of al-Qaeda, but it was not a suicide
operation, as the bombs were left on trains.1 Indeed, the use of cell phones as detonators in
the Madrid bombings is one rationale for why the Aznar government initially suspected that
the Basque organization Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) was behind the attacks, as this form of
detonation was a signature of past ETA attacks. Moreover, prior to the bombings the Aznar
government was favored to easily win the elections that were scheduled three days hence.
Instead, it lost; a result that is widely interpreted as stemming from electoral accountability
in the aftermath of the bombings. For the al-Qaeda organization and its aﬃliates alone, the
1993 World Trade Center bombing; the 29 May 2004 Al-Khobar massacres in Saudi Arabia;
and the 30 June 2007 discovery of explosives found in unattended cars parked at Piccadilly
Circus and Trafalgar Square are additional examples of non-suicide attacks.
Crenshaw (2007) provides a review of thirteen books on the subject of suicide terror-
ism/martyrdom, all of which were published post-9/11, and deal almost exclusively with
suicide bombing from the perspective of the bomber/operative. Yet both Hoﬀman and Mc-
Cormick (2004) and Crenshaw (2007) recognize that suicide actions are rational for the group
that operatives represent, and that explaining how suicide tactics ﬁt into the groups’ overall
strategy of violence is remarkably understudied.2 The purpose of this paper is to examine
1The suspects blew themselves up later to avoid capture.
2In her review, Crenshaw (2007) concludes that there is no longer any need to introduce an analysis of
suicide attacks by explaining to the uninitiated that it is not rooted in psychopathology or fanaticism or
2and characterize — in the context of a weakest-link network — how terrorist entities strate-
gically utilize suicide attacks when other modes of attack are available. As discussed above,
the weakest-link viewpoint may be due to the policymakers’ (or voters’) perception that
successful counterterror policy involves the complete absence of incidents within a deﬁned
protectorate (e.g., Gassebner et al 2008, King 2008, Rosenbaum 2008), or the target itself
may be a network corresponding to a weakest-link technology, as is the case with inter-airline
baggage handling or critical infrastructure. Under either interpretation there is a structural
asymmetry in the terrorist’s favor. In addition, suicide attacks are, on average, far more
severe than conventional attacks, and the severity of attack has been shown to increase the
likelihood of cabinet changes within a government (Gassebner et al 2008).
In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which introduces a suicide attack technol-
ogy that augments terrorist organizations’ ability to allocate conventional resources. There-
fore our focus is not on the rationality of suicide operatives, but on the tradeoﬀs facing a
terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize either or both suicide terrorism tactics
and conventional tactics. In equilibrium, we ﬁnd that: (i) the terrorist organization may
choose with positive probability not to launch any attacks, (ii) in the case that an attack is
launched at most one target is attacked, and (iii) conditional on an attack being launched the
suicide attack technology is not utilized with probability one. Remarkably, we ﬁnd that the
frequency and magnitude of suicide attacks depends on a simple measure that incorporates
the structural asymmetry arising in the weakest-link network and the asymmetry between
the characteristics of both the attacker and the defender which we term the normalized rela-
tive strength of the attacker. As the normalized relative strength of the attacker approaches
unity the conﬂict becomes more symmetric, and the equilibrium frequency and magnitude of
suicide attacks increases. In addition we ﬁnd that the incidence of suicide terrorism increases
as the total cost of utilizing suicide operatives decreases. Given that this total cost includes
the costs of recruiting and training suicide operatives as well as the ﬁnal force expenditure,
our model is consistent with the stylized fact that suicide terrorism is likely to arise in an en-
vironment in which a group has signiﬁcant political support (i.e., lower costs of recruitment)
but not the means for political expression (Hoﬀman and McCormick 2004).
In examining suicide terrorism, our analysis highlights two critical features: (i) weakest-
link networks of targets and (ii) the availability of both conventional and suicide tactics for
the attacker. Weakest-link networks inherently possess an aggregate interdependence among
targets that fundamentally diﬀers from traditional models of strategic resource allocation.
indeed in any single cause such as deprivation, religious belief, or frustration (p.162).
3For example, in the classic Colonel Blotto game3 each target is won by the player who
allocates the higher level of force and the payoﬀ to each player is the sum of the wins across
the entire set of targets, much as the level of a public good that is voluntarily provided is
most often taken to be the sum over individual contributions. By contrast, in our study
both the government’s (defender’s) and terrorists’ (attackers’) payoﬀs are a function of the
minimum over the outcomes at each target, rather than the sum of the outcomes at each
target.4 Additionally, owing to the fact that there is a positive opportunity cost of resource
expenditure, the game which we examine here is not zero-sum.
Examinations of the min aggregator/weakest-link defense technology include Clark and
Konrad (2007), Hausken (2008), and Kovenock and Roberson (2008); however, these models
restrict the attacker to only the conventional allocation of homogenous resources across
targets. In our study, the technology of attack allows for both the continuous allocation of
conventional resources across targets and also a discrete resource — suicide operatives — that
can be used in combination with a conventional attack, or entirely apart from conventional
resources. This allows us to characterize how and why terrorist organizations choose their
mix of conventional and suicide attacks, as those organizations that have suicide operatives
at the ready do not rely exclusively on suicide attacks.
The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2 we describe a model of conﬂict with technolo-
gies of attack and defense in terms of the players, their strategies, and payoﬀs. In section 3
the model is solved with the result being a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. This charac-
terization is consistent with the observation that suicide terrorism is not the exclusive modus
operandi of the way in which terrorists broaden the impact of their actions by creating an
aura of uncertainty through tactics that appear to be random. In particular, we are able
to characterize the frequency of suicide attacks and the nature of terrorist “spectaculars,”
whether of the suicide or conventional variety. The ﬁnal section contains brief concluding
remarks.
3See for example Borel (1921), Gross and Wagner (1950), Roberson (2006), Kvasov (2007), Golman and
Page (2008), Hart (2008), or Roberson and Kvasov (2008).
4Alternative analyses of the macrotechnologies of conﬂict for target governments include defensive versus




We examine a complete-information, simultaneous-move, one-shot game in which two play-
ers, an attacker, A, and a defender, D, allocate their forces across a weakest-link network
consisting of a ﬁnite number, n ≥ 2, of homogenous targets. Each player chooses a level of
a continuous (conventional) one-dimensional force for each of the targets. For the defender
this is the level of defensive force for each target; for the attacker this is the level of the
conventional (non-suicide) force for each target. For both players conventional forces have
a unit cost equal to one, and the level of conventional force allocated to each target must
be nonnegative. In addition to a conventional attack, for each target i the attacker has the
opportunity to send a discrete number of suicide operatives denoted by si ∈ {0,1,2,...}
(where si = 0 denotes no suicide attack) at cost c for each operative which provides an
eﬀective force allocation of S for each operative. Let s = (s1,s2,...,sn) denote the n-tuple
of the attacker’s allocation of suicide operatives across the n targets. To get the same eﬀect
as a suicide attack with conventional forces the attacker would have to allocate S units of
conventional forces to target i.
We focus on the case that the suicide attack is strongly eﬃcient, c < S. For example, the
improvised explosive devices worn or carried by a suicide bomber can cost less than $150 to
produce and the bombers themselves are regarded as expendable assets from the organiza-
tional perspective (Hoﬀman and McCormack 2004). On average, suicide terrorists produce
more than they cost (Atran 2003). By contrast, although discrete, weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD) in the vein of chemical, biological and radio-nuclear (CBRN) attacks have yet
to be proven to be cost eﬃcient for terrorists relative to suicide or conventional attacks, due
to the diﬃculties of procurement and weaponization of CBRN, and increased vulnerability
to detection of WMD by intelligence services (Franck and Melese 2004). Furthermore, the
requirements to be a successful suicide operative are not trivial, involving a level of intel-
ligence that exceeds what is required of operatives in a conventional attack.5 The suicide
attack technology captures the notion that a tactic such as a suicide attack is a discrete
decision that, although cost eﬀective, entails costs — including recruitment, training, and
the ﬁnal force expenditure. As Iannacconne (2006) observes, the number of “martyrs” is
5For example, Sageman (2004) ﬁnds that the suicide operatives of the global Salaﬁst movement (which
includes al-Qaeda) were far more educated than the average person worldwide, with 60% having college
degrees
5very small relative to the total number of the members in the groups that employ suicide
terrorism.
Payoﬀs
Our focus is on a weakest-link network of targets, and the players have asymmetric payoﬀ
functions reﬂecting the structural asymmetry arising in the weakest-link network. For each
target, the player that allocates the higher level of force wins that target. In the case that
the players allocate the same level of force to a target, the defender wins the target. For the
defender success consists of allocating at least as high a level of force to all targets within
the network. Conversely, an attacker is successful if he allocates a higher level of force to at
least one target in the network.
For example, using Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism (MIPT) data,
Gassebner et al (2008) ﬁnd statistically signiﬁcant evidence of a ‘one strike and you’re out’
phenomenon whereby the presence of at least one terror event increases the likelihood of a
cabinet change within a target government, with the likelihood of a change increasing with
the severity of attack. Further, some targets themselves are, by deﬁnition, weakest links.
The luggage transfer of the suitcase bomb that downed Pam Am ﬂight 103 is an example,
as is the interdiction of a twin car bombing plot against Saudi Arabia’s main oil processing
facility (Economist 2008). Similarly, pipeline attacks in Nigeria have had a signiﬁcant impact
on Nigerian oil production as well as on crude prices internationally.
For the defender, let d = (d1,d2,...,dn) denote an n-tuple of forces across the n targets.
Similarly, let a = (a1,a2,...,an) denote an n-tuple of the attacker’s conventional forces,
where ai denotes the attacker’s allocation of conventional force to target i. Recall that
s = (s1,s2,...,sn) denotes the attacker’s n-tuple of suicide operatives. Given that the
attacker may utilize either or both conventional or suicide tactics, we deﬁne the attacker’s
eﬀective force allocation as follows
Deﬁnition 1. The attacker’s eﬀective force allocation for target i is the sum of the attacker’s
allocation of the continuous conventional resource to target i and the force of any and all
suicide operatives allocated to target i:
ˆ ai = ai + Ssi
where the n-tuple of the attacker’s eﬀective force allocations is denoted by ˆ a.
6Observe that if the attacker has chosen an eﬀective force level of ˆ ai for target i such that
S ≤ ˆ ai < 2S, it is clearly cost minimizing for the attacker to set si = 1. Similarly, given an
eﬀective force level of ˆ ai for target i such that λS ≤ ˆ ai < (λ + 1)S for some integer λ, an
optimizing attacker has implicitly chosen si = λ. Note that any eﬀective force level of ˆ ai such
that λS +c < ˆ ai < (λ+1)S is provided at the lowest cost by employing λ suicide operatives
and ˆ ai − λS units of conventional forces. However, the lowest cost of this eﬀective force
level is ˆ ai − λ(S − c), which is greater than the cost of employing λ + 1 suicide operatives,
attaining an eﬀective force level of (λ+1)S > ˆ ai. Consequently, no eﬀective force allocation
ˆ ai such that λS + c < ˆ ai < (λ + 1)S will be optimally employed by the attacker.
Success for the attacker is formally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2. The weakest-link indicator function, denoted by ιWL, takes a value of one if
there exists a target i for which the attacker’s eﬀective force (i.e., the conventional force plus
the force from any and all suicide operatives) exceeds the defensive forces allocated to that






1 if ∃ i | ˆ ai > di
0 otherwise
.
In the event that all targets are successfully defended, the weakest-link indicator function
takes a value of zero, but if any single attack is successful this indicator takes a value of one.
Again, this corresponds to a ‘one strike and you’re out’ implication for an incumbent target
government (Gassebner et al 2008, Rosenbaum 2008). It also refers to the terrorist’s need
to only be lucky once in order to highlight the government’s vulnerability (King 2008).
Alternatively, a collection of speciﬁc targets (e.g., critical infrastructure) may intrinsically
exhibit a weakest-link network structure.
The attacker’s (terrorist’s) payoﬀ function is given by








When any target is successfully attacked, so that ιWL = 1, the terrorist receives the value
of a successful attack, vA, less the cost of the suicide operatives (if any) at each target and
the cost of a conventional attack (if any) at each target. If no target is successfully attacked
these costs are still born by the terrorist. Also, we have normalized the per unit cost of a
conventional attack to one so that c represents the relative cost of a suicide operative.
7The defender’s payoﬀ function is given by








As in an insurance policy, the defender always pays the cost of defense,
 n
i=1 di. This
is augmented by the value of a successful defense, vD, when every target is successfully
defended, thereby reﬂecting a weakest-link vulnerability.
Given that terrorism is a form of asymmetric conﬂict with respect to both the resource
disparity and the structural externalities arising in the weakest-link network of targets, it
will be useful to introduce a simple summary statistic which captures both of these forms
of asymmetry. Recall that the ﬂoor function ⌊x⌋ gives the largest integer less than or equal
to x, and observe that ⌊
vA
c ⌋ is the maximum number of suicide operatives that the terrorist
organization can proﬁtably employ.
Note that the maximum proﬁtable expenditure for the attacker (defender) is vA (vD),
which if used solely by conventional means, translates into a maximal eﬀective force of vA
(vD). However, terrorist organizations also have the ability to utilize suicide operatives. An





i sic, implying that the maximal eﬀective force that can be allocated at a cost of
vA is vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c).
Deﬁnition 3. The normalized relative strength of the attacker, denoted by α, is the ratio of





c ⌋(S − c))
vD
,
where α < 1 implies that the attacker is relatively disadvantaged and α > 1 implies that the
attacker is relatively advantaged. As α → 1 the situation becomes (relatively) symmetric.
The coeﬃcient n applies because under a weakest-link structure the target government
must successfully defend all possible targets from potential attacks. Hence, for the defender
the maximum proﬁtable expenditure that may be allocated equally to all targets is vD/n. If
α < 1, the attacker is relatively disadvantaged, and the defender has the ability to proﬁtably
apply to all n targets a level of force that is greater than the level the attacker can proﬁtably
apply to a single target. Conversely, if α > 1, then the attacker is relatively advantaged,
and the defender does not have the ability to proﬁtably apply to all n targets a level of force
that is greater than what the attacker can proﬁtably apply to a single target.
8To capture the notion that terrorist organizations have a relative resource disadvantage
with respect to the target government, we focus on the case that vD > vA. However, given the
structural asymmetries arising in the weakest-link network of targets, the normalized relative
strength of the attacker identiﬁes whether or not the defender has the ability to allocate
more defensive forces to all n targets than the amount of eﬀective force the attacker can
allocate to any one target (α < 1 and α > 1 respectively). Furthermore, as the normalized
relative strength of the attacker approaches unity we will refer to the conﬂict as being
more symmetric, where this symmetry takes into account both the resource and structural
asymmetries.
In the next section we provide an equilibrium in our model in which the attacker creates
an aura of uncertainty over the mode of attack, conventional and/or suicide, as well as the
identity of the target to be attacked. Hence, the defender faces strategic uncertainty over
both the method of attack and the identity of the target to be attacked.
3 Suicide terrorism: equilibrium and characterization
Note that in our formulation: (i) force expenditures are sunk, (ii) force expenditures have
a positive opportunity cost and (iii) the player who allocates the higher level of force to a
target wins that target with certainty.6 Consequently, if one player wins with certainty, then
the other player’s best response is the strategy vector 0, which minimizes cost in a losing
eﬀort. Then, the winner will reduce the winning force arbitrarily close to zero in order to
reduce cost as well. But then, 0 is no longer a best reply to this strategy. It clearly follows
that there is no pure strategy equilibrium for this class of games.
Let x denote a generic n-tuple of (eﬀective) forces. For the defender, a mixed strategy
(which we term a distribution of force for the defender) is an n-variate distribution function
PD : Rn
+ → [0,1], where PD(x) = Pr{di ≤ xi for all i} denotes the probability that each
di in a random n-tuple d drawn from the n-variate distribution function PD is less than or
equal to the corresponding xi in the n-tuple x ∈ Rn
+. Note that the univariate marginal
distribution of PD for the ith target, F i
D(xi) = Pr{di ≤ xi}, denotes the probability that at
target i the level of force di is less than or equal to xi.
For the attacker, a pure strategy is a 2n-tuple consisting of the n-tuple of the attacker’s
allocation of the continuous resource across the n targets and the n-tuple of the attacker’s
6More formally, the conﬂict at each target utilizes the deterministic auction contest success function. See
Baye, et al. (1996).
9allocation of suicide operatives across the n targets. It follows directly that our focus on
the attacker’s eﬀective force allocation does not place any restrictions on the correlation
structures available to the attacker. To simplify the following expressions we will focus on
the attacker’s eﬀective force allocation.
A mixed strategy for the attacker (which we term a distribution of eﬀective force for the
attacker) may thus be written as an n-variate distribution function ˆ PA : Rn
+ → [0,1], where
ˆ PA(x) = Pr{ˆ ai ≤ xi for all i} denotes the probability that the n-tuple of forces x ∈ Rn
+
successfully defends each and every target i from attack given that the attacker’s eﬀective
allocation of force across the n targets, ˆ a, is a random n-tuple drawn from the n-variate
distribution function ˆ PA.
Below we examine an equilibrium for all parameter conﬁgurations in which neither the
suicide attack technology is prohibitively costly for the attacker (vA ≤ c) nor the defender is
so weak that suicide tactics are always suboptimal for the attacker (
vD
n < c). The remaining
cases, as well as the proof of our main theorem, are included in the appendix.
Recall that if there exists an integer λ such that λS ≤ ˆ ai < (λ+1)S, then an optimizing
attacker has implicitly chosen si = λ. In the analysis that follows it will also be helpful to
deﬁne the following two functions, for x, ˆ x ∈ [0,(⌊
vA







xi − λ(S − c) if λS ≤ xi < λS + c






ˆ xi if λS ≤ ˆ xi < λS + c
λS + c if λS + c ≤ ˆ xi < (λ + 1)S
.
To interpret g(xi) and h(ˆ xi) note that it is suboptimal for a cost-minimizing attacker
to allocate an eﬀective force of ˆ xi ∈ (λS + c,(λ + 1)S) for any integer λ = 0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋
[doing so is strictly dominated by the eﬀective force ˆ xi = (λ + 1)S]. For the defender, this
suboptimal region corresponds to force allocations xi ∈ (λS + c,(λ + 1)S) for any integer
λ = 0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋. Over the set of attacker’s cost-minimizing eﬀective force levels and the
corresponding defensive force levels [i.e., ˆ xi,xi ∈ [λS,λS+c] for any integer λ = 0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋],
the functions g(xi) and h(ˆ xi) identify the attacker’s minimal cost for allocating an eﬀective
force equal to xi units of defensive force and the defender’s minimal cost for allocating force
equal to ˆ xi units of eﬀective attack force, respectively. For ˆ xi,xi ∈ (λS + c,(λ + 1)S), the
function g(xi) is completed by inserting the attacker’s cost of eﬀective force allocation at the
10upper endpoint of the interval, where λ+1 suicide operatives are employed, and the function
h(ˆ xi) is completed by inserting the defender’s cost of force allocation at the lower endpoint
of the interval.
Theorem 1. A Nash equilibrium of the model of terrorism with suicide attack is for each
player to allocate his forces as follows.
(a) If α < 1, then for player D and x ∈ [0,vA + ⌊
vA








Similarly for player A and ˆ x ∈ [0,vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)]n,





The expected payoﬀ for player A is 0, and the expected payoﬀ for player D is vD(1−α).
(b) For α ≥ 1 and c ≤ (vD/n), let ¯ λ be the largest nonnegative integer such that ¯ λS <
vD
n .
(i) If ¯ λS <
vD
n < ¯ λS + c, then for player D and x ∈ [0,(vD/n)]n,
PD (x) = 1 −









Similarly for player A and ˆ x ∈ [0,(vD/n)]n,





The expected payoﬀ for player A is vA−(vD/n)+¯ λ(S−c), and the expected payoﬀ
for player D is 0.
(ii) If ¯ λS + c ≤
vD
n ≤ (¯ λ + 1)S, then for player D and x ∈ [0, ¯ λS + c]n,
PD (x) = 1 −









11Similarly for player A and ˆ x ∈ [0,(¯ λ + 1)S]n,












The expected payoﬀ for player A is vA − (¯ λ + 1)c, and the expected payoﬀ for
player D is 0.
Figure 1 provides the supports of the equilibrium distributions of eﬀective force for case
(a) of Theorem 1 with ⌊
vA
c ⌋ = 2 and only two targets in the weakest-link network (n = 2).7
In case (a), as in all cases, the attacker launches an attack on at most one target. Note
also that in case (a), as in all cases, the defender’s allocation of force has perfect positive
correlation. One property of this correlation structure is that for any given level of force the
probability that the attacker destroys at least one target is maximized if the attack is on
a single target. As a result the attacker launches an attack on at most one target. When
as in case (a) the normalized relative strength of the attacker is less than one, the attacker
launches at most one attack and launches no attacks with probability 1−α. Figure 2 provides
the supports of the equilibrium distributions of eﬀective force for subcase (i) of case (b) of
Theorem 1 with ⌊
vA
c ⌋ = 2 and only two targets in the weakest-link network (n = 2). In this
case, the attacker launches exactly one attack with certainty. The equilibrium number of
attacks is summarized in corollary 1.
Corollary 1. In cases (a) and (b) of Theorem 1, for any realization of his equilibrium strat-
egy the attacker attacks at most one target. In any case (b) realization the attacker launches
an attack on exactly one target. In case (a) the attacker’s equilibrium strategy attacks a
single target with probability α, and launches no attacks with the remaining probability.
The proof of corollary 1 is contained in the proof of Theorem 1 given in the appendix. It is
important to note that our formulation of attack and defense features endogenous entry and
force expenditure decisions and allows for the players to use general correlation structures
for force expenditures across the targets within the weakest-link network.8 In contrast, much
of the existing literature [e.g. Azaiez and Bier (2007), Bier and Abhichandani (2003), Bier
et al. (2005), Bier et al. (2007), Levitin and Ben-Haim (2008), and Rosendorﬀ and Sandler
(2004) among others] assumes that the number of terrorist attacks (which is usually set to
7Recall that the support of an n-variate distribution function P, is the complement of the union of all
open sets of Rn with P-volume zero.




































Figure 1: Supports of case (a) equilibrium joint distributions with ⌊
vA










































Figure 2: Supports of case (b), (i) equilibrium joint distributions with λ = 2 and n = 2.
13one) is exogenously speciﬁed. Additionally, several of the existing models which allow for
the attacker to endogenously choose the number of targets to attack9 obtain the paradoxical
result, that even when (as in a weakest-link network) the attacker’s objective is to destroy a
single target, the attacker optimally chooses to attack every target with certainty. Conversely,
we ﬁnd that the attacker optimally chooses to attack at most one target, but each target is
chosen with positive probability.
Given the endogenous number of targets that are attacked in the equilibrium given in
Theorem 1, we now examine (i) the probability of a suicide attack conditional on an attack
being made and (ii) the expected number of suicide operatives that are utilized conditional
on a suicide attack being launched. Recall that if λS ≤ ˆ ai < (λ + 1)S then an optimizing
attacker has implicitly set si = λ. Let c and 0 denote the n-tuples (c,...,c) and (0,...,0),
respectively. The conditional probability that the attacker launches at least one suicide
attack is given by (1− ˆ PA(c))/(1− ˆ PA(0)), where ˆ PA( ) is player A’s distribution of eﬀective
force. Recall that ˆ PA(c) = Pr{ˆ ai ≤ c for all i} is the probability that no attack exceeds level
c — and therefore does not require suicide operatives — and 1− ˆ PA(c) is the probability of
at least one suicide attack. Similarly, ˆ PA(0) is the probability of no attack and 1 − ˆ PA(0)
is the probability that at least one attack is made. In case (a), the conditional probability
of suicide attack is 1 − (c/(vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c))). In case (b), the conditional probability of
suicide attack is 1−(nc/vD). Although the upper bound of the number of equilibrium suicide
operatives ⌊
vA
c ⌋ is not continuously diﬀerentiable with respect to vA and c, it follows that —
in cases (a) and (b) and for all marginal changes which hold ⌊
vA
c ⌋ constant — the conditional
probability that the attacker utilizes a suicide attack is decreasing in the cost of a suicide
operative (c).
Recalling that the normalized relative strength of the attacker is the relevant measure
of the symmetry of the conﬂict, consider two simple symmetry increasing transformations
corresponding to the attacker having a normalized relative strength advantage and disad-
vantage repectively. The simple transformation for the case in which the attacker has a
normalized relative strength disadvantage [case (a) of Theorem 1], which we term a cost
invariant increase in the attacker’s relative strength, corresponds to an increase in the ex-
pression vA +⌊
vA
c ⌋S, where again we focus on marginal changes which hold ⌊
vA
c ⌋ constant.10
In case (a) any simple transformation of this form results in an increase in the normalized rel-
9Most closely related is Clark and Konrad (2007) who, utilizing the Tullock contest success function, also
examine a weakest-link network. See also Hausken (2008).
10This restriction allows for all marginal changes such that S increases and/or vA increases, subject to
⌊vA
c ⌋ remaining constant.
14ative strength of the attacker which approaches one from below. The simple transformation
for the case in which the attacker has a normalized relative strength advantage [case (b) of
Theorem 1], which we term a relative increase in the defender’s strength, corresponds to an
increase in the expression (vD/n). In case (b), a relative increase in the defender’s strength
leads to a decrease in the normalized relative strength of the attacker which approaches one
from above.
In case (a) the normalized relative strength of the attacker is less than one, and for all cost
invariant increases in the attacker’s relative strength the conditional probability of suicide
attack is increasing. Similarly, in case (b) the normalized relative strength of the attacker
is greater than one, and for all relative increases in the defender’s strength the conditional
probability of suicide attack is increasing. That is, the more symmetric the conﬂict the
more likely the attacker is to utilize suicide operatives when an attack is launched. These
properties of the conditional probability of suicide attack are summarized in corollary 2.
Corollary 2. In cases (a) and (b) of Theorem 1, the conditional probability that the at-
tacker utilizes at least one suicide operative is: (i) decreasing with respect to the cost of
suicide operatives, and (ii) increasing with respect to our two simple symmetry increasing
transformations of the environment.
The characterization above indicates that although terrorist organizations attack at most
one target, suicide operations are not the exclusive modus operandi even when such opera-
tives are available; the terrorist leadership randomizes over conventional and suicide tactics.
For example, al-Qaeda has been associated with conventional (non-suicide) events such as
the Madrid train station bombing, the Al-Khobar massacres in Saudi Arabia, and 2007 at-
tempted car bombings of Piccadilly Circus and Trafalgar Square. As noted by Sandler et
al (2008), terrorists broaden their audience beyond the immediate victim by making their
attacks and tactics appear to be random, so that everyone feels at risk. Furthermore, the
use of suicide operatives is an increasing function of the relative symmetry of terrorists and
target governments. This is a novel insight given that the literature on terrorism almost ex-
clusively emphasizes the resource asymmetry between target governments and terrorists but
does not incorporate alternative technologies of attack or defense. Our measure of symmetry,
α, captures the potential for the weakest link technology to balance resource disparities. In
particular, symmetry within a weakest-link framework leads to an increased likelihood of
suicide attack.
Moreover, terrorist organizations not only randomize over the use of suicide and conven-
tional tactics, but also the level of eﬀective force. In the case of a suicide attack this involves
15randomization over the number of suicide operatives that are utilized. Recalling that the
probability that the attacker launches a suicide attack is 1 − ˆ PA(c), the case (a) expected












1 − ˆ PA((⌊
vA
c ⌋ − 1)S + c)
 
1 − ˆ PA(c)
where the term ˆ PA(iS + c) − ˆ PA((i − 1)S + c) is the probability that the attacker allocates
exactly i suicide operatives. In case (b) (i) [case (b) (ii)] the expected number of suicide
operatives conditional on a suicide attack being launched is similarly calculated by replacing
each ⌊
vA
c ⌋ in the above expression with ¯ λ [(¯ λ+1)]. Table 1 provides the expected number of
















































Table 1: Expected number of suicide operatives conditional on the launch of a suicide attack
As was the case with the conditional probability that the attacker launches a suicide
attack, the expected number of suicide operatives conditional on a suicide attack being
launched is decreasing with respect to the cost of each suicide operative. Furthermore, in case
(a) the expected number of suicide operatives conditional on a suicide attack being launched
is increasing for all cost invariant increases in the attacker’s relative strength, and in case
(b) the expected number is increasing for all relative increases in the defender’s strength.
That is, the expected number of suicide operatives conditional on a suicide attack being
launched increases as the conﬂict becomes more symmetric, according to the normalized
relative strength of the attacker. The properties of the expected number of suicide operatives
conditional on a suicide attack being launched are summarized in Corollary 3.
Corollary 3. In cases (a) and (b) of Theorem 1, the expected number of suicide operatives
conditional on the attacker launching a suicide attack is: (i) decreasing with respect to the
16cost of each suicide operative, and (ii) increasing with respect to the two simple symmetry
increasing transformations of the environment.
As highlighted above, the level of symmetry in the conﬂict, which depends on both the
characteristics of the players and those of the weakest-link network, is a pivotal determinant
of the optimal attack and defense strategies. In particular, note that in case (a) the attacker
launches at most one attack and launches no attacks with positive probability. However, the
probability that the attacker launches an attack is weakly increasing as the normalized rela-
tive strength of the attacker approaches unity (i.e., as the conﬂict becomes more symmetric).
Thus, for both of the simple symmetry increasing transformations of the environment: (i) the
probability of a terrorist event weakly increases, (ii) the conditional probability that such an
event involves a suicide attack increases and (iii) the expected number of suicide operatives
conditional on a suicide attack increases. Although the logic of this result is straightforward,
this does complicate the conventional wisdom that an increase in the frequency and magni-
tude of terrorist attacks (of either the conventional or suicide variety) signals desperation on
the part of a weakened terrorist organization. In particular, this popular characterization
applies only in the case that the attacker has a normalized relative strength advantage. If
the the attacker is disadvantaged with respect to his normalized relative strength, then an
increase in the frequency and magnitude of terrorist attacks signals that the terrorist has
actually become relatively stronger and the conﬂict has become more symmetric.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we examine a model of terrorism which focuses not on the rationality of suicide
operatives, but on the tradeoﬀs facing a terrorist organization that has the ability to utilize
either or both suicide terrorism tactics and conventional tactics. A second feature of our
focus is weakest-link networks of targets and the structural asymmetries between attack and
defense. In this context, we ﬁnd that the attacker endogenously launches at most one attack.
The attacker randomizes over exclusively using a conventional attack, exclusively using a
suicide attack, and using a combination of a suicide attack and a conventional attack all with
positive probability. Conditional on an attack being launched, the probability of a suicide
attack depends on both the structural asymmetry arising in the weakest-link network and
the asymmetry between the characteristics of both the attacker and the defender. Indeed, we
show that the strategic implications of asymmetry between terrorists and target governments
cannot be fully captured by diﬀerences in available resources but must also take into account
17the technologies of attack and defense. The availability of suicide operatives acting against a
weakest-link defense can lead to a previously unrecognized symmetrization of conﬂict. As the
conﬂict becomes more symmetric, suicide attacks are more likely to occur, and, conditional
on a suicide attack being launched, the expected number of suicide operatives is increasing.
This paper contributes to the analysis of the logic of suicide terrorism in ﬁnding that sui-
cide operatives represent a discrete increase in terrorists’ eﬀective force that can symmetrize
their conﬂict with target governments. This is particularly the case when governments are
subject to a weakest-link defense technology (or deﬁnition of successful counterterror policy),
as investigated here. Governments would do well by deemphasizing the importance of an
individual attack and continuing with everyday life, as is often the case in Europe, whereas
US policy continues to be cast in terms of publicly emphasizing terrorists’ success. Under
such a policy change extensions to our model that recognize alternative technologies and/or
multiple terror attacks may come into play.
18Appendix
This appendix contains the proof of Theorem 1 and the statement of Theorem A.1, which
provides an equilibrium in the remaining parameter conﬁgurations [i.e., the suicide attack
technology is prohibitively costly for the attacker (vA ≤ c) or the defender is so weak that
suicide tactics are suboptimal for the attacker (
vD
n < c)].
Theorem A. 1. For the remaining parameter conﬁgurations a Nash equilibrium of the model
of terrorism is for each player to allocate his forces as follows:








Similarly for player A and ˆ x ∈ [0,vA]n,








The expected payoﬀ for player A is 0, and the expected payoﬀ for player D is vD−nvA.
(d) If (i) α ≥ 1 and (vD/n) < c ≤ S, then for player D and x ∈ [0,(vD/n)]n,










Similarly for player A and ˆ x ∈ [0,(vD/n)]n,





The expected payoﬀ for player A is vA − (vD/n), and the expected payoﬀ for player D
is 0.
Proof of Theorem 1
This proof, which is for case (a), shows that the pair of joint distribution functions PD and
ˆ PA form a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. In particular, we show that for each player
each point in the support of their equilibrium n-variate distribution functions (stated in
19Theorem 1) results in the same expected payoﬀ, and there are no proﬁtable deviations from
this support. The proofs of cases (b)-(d) following along similar lines.
We begin with the support of each player’s case (a) equilibrium distribution of force. For
yk ≤ zk for all k = 1,2,...,n, let [y,z] denote the n-box B = [y1,z1]×[y2,z2]×...×[yn,zn],
the Cartesian product of n closed intervals. The vertices of an n-box B are the points
(v1,v2,...,vn) where vk is equal to yk or zk. Recall the following two deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 4. Given an n-variate distribution P, the P-volume of the n-box [y,z] is given
by












ykP (t) = P (t1,...,tk−1,zk,tk+1,...,tn) − P (t1,...,tk−1,yk,tk+1,...,tn)
Deﬁnition 5. The support of an n-variate distribution function, P, is the complement of
the union of all open sets of Rn with P-volume zero.
Given Deﬁnitions 4 and 5 it is straightforward to show that in all feasible case (a) param-
eter conﬁgurations the support of player D’s equilibrium distribution of force is is uniformly
distributed along the following set of line segments.11 One line segment connects the ori-
gin with the point c ≡ (c,c,...,c). For µ = 1,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋ − 1 there are also line segments
connecting the points µS to the point µS − c. If vA − c⌊
vA
c ⌋ > 0, then there is also a line
segment that connects the point ⌊
vA
c ⌋S to the point vA − ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c). Similarly, the sup-
port of player A’s eﬀective distribution of force consists of the combination of a set of mass
points and mass uniformly distributed along a set of line segments both of which are located
on the axes. One mass point of size 1 −
n(va+S−c)
vD is located at the origin. On each axis i
there are ⌊
vA
c ⌋ mass points of size
S−c
vD located at the points ˆ xi = µS for µ = 1,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋.
There is one line segment on each axis from the origin to the point ˆ xi = c. On each axis
i and for µ = 1,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋ − 1, there are also line segments from ˆ xi = µS to ˆ xi = µS + c.
If vA − c⌊
vA
c ⌋ > 0, then there is also a line segment on each axis i from ˆ xi = ⌊
vA
c ⌋S to
ˆ xi = vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c).
For each point in the support of player D’s strategy, player D must have the same expected
payoﬀ. Let D denote the set of n-tuples x such that ˜ µS ≤ xi ≤ min{˜ µS+c,vA+⌊
vA
c ⌋(S−c)}
11Figure 1 shows that for ⌊vA
c ⌋ = 2 and n = 2 the support of player D’s distribution of force PD is
uniformly distributed along the three shaded line segments.
20for ˜ µ = 0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋ and i = 1,...,n. Note that the support of player D’s equilibrium strategy
is a strict subset of D.
If player A is using the equilibrium strategy ˆ PA given in (2), then the expected payoﬀ to










From equation (2), the probability that with an allocation of d player D wins every target
i is
ˆ PA (d) = 1 −
n(vA + ⌊
vA







Inserting equation (12) into (11) and simplifying, the expected payoﬀ to player D from any
allocation d ∈ D, is vD−n(vA+⌊
vA
c ⌋(S−c)). Thus, as the support of player D’s equilibrium
strategy is contained in D, each point in the support of the n-variate distribution function
PD results in the same expected payoﬀ.
To show that there are no proﬁtable deviations from this support, note that for ˜ µ =
0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋ it is clearly suboptimal for player D to allocate a level of force di to any target
i = 1,...,n such that min{˜ µS+c,vA+⌊
vA
c ⌋(S−c)} < di < (˜ µ+1)S. In any such allocation,
player D could decrease his cost without changing his probability of winning all of the targets
by setting di = min{˜ µS + c,vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)}. That is, it is suboptimal for player D to
allocate a level of force above vA +⌊
vA
c ⌋(S −c) or to allocate a level of force between ˜ µS +c
and (˜ µ + 1)S to any target. However, this rules out all n-tuples in Rn
+ − D from being
proﬁtable deviations. As established above all n-tuples in D yield the same expected payoﬀ.
Thus, for player D there are no proﬁtable deviations from the distribution of force PD given
in (1).
The case of player A is similar. For each point in the support of player A’s strategy,
player A must have the same expected payoﬀ. Note that the support of ˆ PA consists of
all eﬀective force allocations ˆ a ∈ Rn
+ such that there exists exactly one target i in which
˜ µS ≤ ˆ ai ≤ min{˜ µS + c,vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)} for ˜ µ = 0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋ and ˆ ai′ = 0 for all i′  = i.
Clearly, it is cost minimizing for the attacker to set si = ˜ µ. Thus, ˆ ai = ai+˜ µS and, it follows
that 0 ≤ ai ≤ c for the one target that receives a positive level of eﬀective force.
Given that player D is using the equilibrium strategy PD given in (1) the expected
payoﬀ to player A from an eﬀective force allocation ˆ a from the support of ˆ PA in which
21˜ µS ≤ ˆ ai ≤ min{˜ µS + c,vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)} is
πA (ˆ a,PD) = vAPD
 
ˆ ai,{vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)}i′ =i
 
− ˜ µc − ai (13)
where PD
 
ˆ ai,{vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)}i′ =i
 
is the probability that player A wins target i. Note
that PD
 
ˆ ai,{vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)}i′ =i
 
is the univariate marginal distribution of PD for the ith
target, which we will henceforth denote as F i
D. From equation (1), it follows that for any
eﬀective force allocation in the support of ˆ PA player A’s expected payoﬀ is





− ˜ µc − ai = 0
as g(ˆ ai) = ai + ˜ µc for all such points.
We now show that there are no proﬁtable deviations from the support of player A’s
equilibrium joint distribution. Note that if player A attacks only one target i, then it is
clearly suboptimal for player A to allocate a level of eﬀective force ˆ ai such that min{˜ µS +
c,vA +⌊
vA
c ⌋(S −c)} < ˆ ai < (˜ µ+1)S. That is, it is clearly strictly dominated for player A to
allocate an eﬀective level of force above vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c) or to allocate an eﬀective level of
force strictly between ˜ µS+c and (˜ µ+1)S to target i. The only remaining possible deviation
from the support is for player A to allocate a strictly positive level of eﬀective force to two
or more targets.
The probability that player A wins both targets i and i′ is given by the bivariate marginal
distribution PD(ˆ ai,ˆ ai′,{vA + ⌊
vA
c ⌋(S − c)}i′′ =i,i′), which we will denote as P
i,i′
D (ˆ ai,ˆ ai′). The
expected payoﬀ to player A for any allocation of force ˆ a ∈ Rn
+ which allocates a strictly
positive level of force to two targets i, i′ is
πA (ˆ a,PD) = vAF
i
D (ˆ ai) + vAF
i′
D (ˆ ai′) − vAP
i,i′
D (ˆ ai,ˆ ai′) − (ai + csi) − (ai′ + csi′).
Simplifying,
πA (ˆ a,PD) ≤ −vAP
i,i′
D (ˆ ai,ˆ ai′) < 0
where the left-hand weak inequality holds with equality if for k = i,i′ there exist ˜ µk ∈
[0,...,⌊
vA
c ⌋] such that ˆ ak ∈ [˜ µkS,min{˜ µkS+c,vA+⌊
vA
c ⌋(S−c)] and ˆ ak = ak+˜ µkS. Further-
more, P
i,i′
D (ˆ ai,ˆ ai′) > 0 as ˆ ai,ˆ ai′ > 0, and thus it is unproﬁtable for player A to to allocate a
strictly positive level of eﬀective force to two targets.
The case of player A allocating a strictly positive level of force to more than two targets
follows directly. Clearly, in any optimal strategy player A never allocates a strictly positive
22level of force to more than one target. This concludes the proof that in case (1) the pair
of joint distribution functions PD and ˆ PA constitute a Nash equilibrium of the model of
terrorism with suicide attack. The proofs of cases (b)-(d) follow a similar line of argument.
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